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I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, principally during actual or feared 
times of war, the United States government has seemingly 
interpreted the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution as a mere suggestion and not as the “Supreme Law 
of the Land.” This has led to well-documented difficulties 
related to infringement upon individuals’ Constitutional rights. 
In this article, the governmental action taken to combat 
“sedition” in two distinct periods of American History will be 
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addressed. I suggest that while people attack Lincoln for 
suspending habeas corpus, thus providing a gateway to 
Constitutional violations, this is just another act throughout the 
course of history in which the United States Government has 
violated Constitutional rights in favor of “national security.”  
II. DUE TO ITS VIOLATION OF NUMEROUS INDIVIDUALS’ FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS, THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 WAS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In the years preceding the enactment of the Sedition Act 
of 1798, America was combating turmoil on two fronts. Not 
only enveloped with the fear of military engagement with the 
French, America was also experiencing feuding among its 
citizens; feuding that was befalling between the Federalists and 
the Democratic-Republicans. This scorn between parties 
stemmed from Federalist accusations against the Democratic-
Republicans, or as Alexander Hamilton labeled them, the 
“Jeffersonians,” arraigning them as pro-French supporters. 
Throwing smoke on the fire, Hamilton further characterized the 
Jeffersonians as “more Frenchmen than Americans” and 
further, claimed that they were prepared “to immolate the 
independence and welfare of their country at the shrine of 
France.” With fear of a Jeffersonian aligned French spy 
infiltrating the country, the Federalist majority in Congress 
passed three new laws in June and July of 1798. These laws, 
with the primary purpose of punishing “sedition” against 
President John Adams or any Federalist politician alike, were 
titled the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
A. SETTING AND CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE ENACTMENT OF 
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 
Although veiled in a French colored cape, the Alien and 
Sedition Acts were a blatant power move by President Adams 
and his Federalist led Congress to silence the Jeffersonians.2 
Although fought with “vigorous Jeffersonian opposition,” the 
Federalists passed these Alien and Sedition Acts. The 
Federalists asserted that these Acts were “necessary in order to 
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protect the security of the Nation [by giving] the President the 
broadest of powers over aliens and [making] substantial 
inroads upon the freedoms of speech, press and assembly.”3 
These Alien and Sedition Acts consisted of three different 
statutes enacted in 1798: 1 Stat. 570; 1 Stat. 577; and 1 Stat. 596.4 
These statutes, and in pertinent part here, the Sedition Act, are 
some of the most embarrassing and most grandiose 
infringements of American freedom to date.5 Some of the most 
abhorrent actions resulting from the Sedition Act include: 
publishers being jailed for writing their own views and for 
publishing the views of others6; federal prosecutors feverishly 
and maliciously attacking critics of the Federal Government or 
Federal officials7; the widespread formulation of rumors which 
tainted the name of good and bad men alike and sometimes 
“causing the social ostracism of people who loved their free 
country with a deathless devotion.”8  
Although citizens far and wide were negatively affected 
by the wrath of the Sedition Act, members of the Jeffersonian 
Party were largely targeted to serve as examples of what would 
happen to those who refused to “worship” President Adams, 
other federal officials, and their policies.9 The Sedition Act did 
not discriminate among carpenters, preachers, lawyers, or 
teachers.10 If one held a Jeffersonian political ideology or felt 
any sense of loyalty to the French, whether through family ties, 
heritage, etc., they immediately became targets of the Sedition 
Act and often times were punished under the guise of an 
“administration of justice.”11  
B. THE LAW ITSELF, THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 
The Sedition Act can be read as: 
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That if any person shall write, print, utter or 
publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious 
writing or writings against the government of 
the United States . . . or the President of the 
United States, with intent to defame the said 
government . . . or the said President, or to bring 
them . . . into contempt or disrepute; or to excite 
against them . . . the hatred of the good people of 
the United States . . . then such person . . . shall 
be punished by a fine not exceeding two 
thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not 
exceeding two years.12 
The Sedition Act included two general classes of 
offenses against the United States. The first section of the Act 
made it a federal crime to conspire or counsel others to break 
the law of or interfere with the lawful authority of the United 
States.13 In a broad sense, this section targeted overt acts that 
approached a violation of the law or the breach of the peace. Yet 
more specifically, section one was related to criminal actions 
rather than political speech or press content.  
Section two contains the more well-known prohibitions 
enacted by the Sedition Act, including the prohibition of certain 
publications. Section two essentially codified common law 
seditious libel, and further, granted jurisdiction to federal 
courts to hear trials brought under the Sedition Act.14 Although 
sections one and two implicated different actions, they worked 
in harmony with one another, to prohibit activities tending to 
oppose or undermine lawful governmental authority.15 Where 
section one prohibited criminal conspiracy or advocacy against 
federal laws, section two sought to punish individuals who 
published matters which had an indirect and general tendency 
to excite opposition to the government.16 The last important 
                                                 
12 An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United 
States, 5th Cong., 2d Sess., Ch. 74 (1798); Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 496 (1798) 
(expired 1801). 
13 David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 & the Incorporation of 
Seditious Libel into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 154, 165 (2001). 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
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note about the Sedition Act was its date of termination, which 
just so happened to coincide with the final day of President 
Adams’ tenure.17 
C. LANDMARK ARRESTS UNDER THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 
AND COMMON LAW SEDITIOUS LIBEL 
At its first totaling, seventeen indictments were issued 
for seditious libel, with fourteen being issued under the 
Sedition Act and three being issued under common law 
seditious libel.18 Not only were individuals’ rights being 
violated, but Secretary of State Timothy Pickering prosecuted 
four of the five most influential Jeffersonian journals, as well as 
several Jeffersonian newspapers, which violated the entities 
Freedom of the Press.19 In turn, several of these publications 
were forced to close, while others were forced to halt 
production when their editors were imprisoned.20 Following 
the same trend of persecuting only Jeffersonian publications, 
not a single Federalist was arrested during this tumultuous, 
Constitution-defying era. Below, you will find some of the most 
notorious arrests stemming from the John Adams’ 
administration’s attempt at “silencing sedition.” 
1. HEY, SEDITION ACT OF 1798, WHO WAS YOUR FIRST? . 
. . I’LL NEVER FORGET HIM; HIS NAME WAS MATTHEW 
LYON. 
One simple act was all it took; one simple act of 
opposition against the Sedition Act of 1798; a simple opinion 
such as that the Sedition Act of 1798 would force people to 
“hold their tongues and make toothpicks of their pens.”21 This 
was all that was needed to make Matthew Lyon the first person 
                                                 
17 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 51 
(2004).  
18 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 48 
(2004). Approximately twenty-five “well-known” Jeffersonians were 
arrested, fifteen of which led to indictments. Id. at 63. 
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
21 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 20 
(2004).  
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indicted and arrested under the Sedition Act of 1798.22 
Although this arrest sent shockwaves through America, this 
was no surprise to Mr. Lyon, as he often stated that arrest under 
the Sedition Act “very likely would be brought to bear on [him] 
the very first.”23 
Matthew Lyon was indicted by a grand jury on October 
5, 1798.24 Ultimately, the grand jury charged Mr. Lyon with 
“malicious” intent “to bring the President and government of 
the United States into contempt,” and therefore, he had violated 
the Sedition Act of 1798.25 The final straw and ultimate 
utterance that led to Mr. Lyon’s arrest was for stating that under 
President Adams:  
[E]very consideration of the public welfare [was] 
swallowed up in a continual grasp for power, in 
an unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, 
foolish adulation, and selfish avarice.26  
Although the previous statement was the dagger in the 
heart for Mr. Lyon, he was also quoted stating opinions such as 
“that Adams should be sent to a ‘mad house’ for the way he 
dealt with the French.”27 Due to his constant ridicule of the 
Federalists and statements such as these, Mr. Lyon was one of 
the most despised and hated Jeffersonians in the nation.28 Most 
likely related to this hatred, Mr. Lyon was given a hefty fine, as 
well as jail time for his utterances. Specifically, Mr. Lyon’s 
punishment consisted of a $1,000.00 fine29, partnered with four 
months of jail time.30 Although this was the stated jail time, Mr. 
                                                 
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 48.  
24 Id. at 50.  
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 20.  
27 Id. at 49.  
28 Id.  
29 Just to put this fine into today’s dollar amount, a $1,000 fine in 
1798, is equal to a current day fine of approximately $19,383.97. 
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30 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 51 
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Lyon was also informed that he would be imprisoned until the 
fine was paid in total, regardless of how long it took, as long as 
it was longer than the original four-month sentence. On top of 
the excessive fine and imprisonment, Mr. Lyon was not granted 
time to arrange his affairs or collect his papers, was imprisoned 
a two-day and forty-five-mile trip away from his home and the 
county where he was sentenced, and lastly, was kept in a fetid, 
algid cell.31 
Justice Black summarized the above-mentioned atrocity 
very well in his dissent in Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive 
Activities Control Bd. His dissent, in pertinent part, stated: 
The enforcement of . . . the Sedition Act, 
constitutes one of the greatest blots on our 
country’s record of freedom. Publishers were 
sent to jail for writing their own views and for 
publishing the views of others. The slightest 
criticism of Government or policies of 
government officials was enough to cause biased 
federal prosecutors to put the machinery of 
Government to work to crush and imprison the 
critic . . . . Members of the Jeffersonian Party 
were picked out as special targets so that they 
could be illustrious examples of what could 
happen to people who failed to sing paeans of 
praise for current federal officials and their 
policies. Matthew Lyon, a Congressman of the 
Jeffersonian Party [hailing from Vermont], was 
prosecuted, convicted and forced to serve a 
prison sentence in a disreputable jailhouse 
because of criticisms he made of governmental 
officials and their activities. This was a 
particularly egregious example of the repressive 
nature of the Sedition Act for Lyon’s conviction 
could not possibly have been upheld under even 
the most niggardly interpretation of the First 
Amendment. Lyon was but one of many who 
                                                 
31 Id.  
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had to go to jail, be fined, or otherwise be made 
to suffer for the expression of his public views.32 
Although Mr. Lyon was arrested, fined, and imprisoned 
in these terrible conditions, he seemingly got the last laugh of 
the situation. Despite public outcry, President Adams refused 
to release Mr. Lyon. This only aroused the displeased even 
more. Due to his public rise to fame, as well as many supporting 
his cause, Mr. Lyon was reelected to Congress while serving his 
sentence in federal prison.33 
2. ANOTHER VERMONTER IN THE SLAMMER 
As Matthew Lyon was the first to be indicted and 
arrested, it was bound to be that one’s supporting his cause 
would follow suit. One of the more notable names that were 
arrested due to his support of Matthew Lyon was a man named 
Anthony Haswell. Mr. Haswell held several titles, with the one 
to note here being that of the editor of the Vermont Gazette.34 The 
statement that put away Mr. Haswell was one that he published 
in support of raising funds for the egregious fine given to Mr. 
Lyon.35 The statement read:  
“Your representative . . . is holden by the 
oppressive hand of usurped power in a 
loathsome prison, suffering all the indignities 
which can be heaped upon him by a hard-
hearted savage, who has, to the disgrace of 
Federalism, been elevated to a station where he 
can satiate his barbarity on the misery of his 
victims.”36 
                                                 
32 Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 
U.S. 1, 155-59 (1961) (internal citations omitted).  
33 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 52-
53 (2004).  
34 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 63 
(2004).  
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
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Mr. Haswell then summarized by saying that help was 
needed to “bring liberty to the defender of your right.”37 This 
publication was enough to get Mr. Haswell charged under the 
Sedition Act. The circumstances of his arrest followed closely to 
the cruelty exhibited to Mr. Lyon. Mr. Haswell, a feeble man, 
was physically dragged out of his house in the earliest hours of 
the morning, forced to ride sixty miles in the rain to prison, and 
then after having arrived, was thrown into a filthy, cold prison 
cell while still in his sopping wet clothing. On top of all of this, 
when offered a sum of money to post bail, Jabez Finch (the same 
man that arrested Matthew Lyon) refused to accept it or let Mr. 
Haswell go. Although less punitive than the measures assigned 
to Mr. Lyon, after Mr. Haswell was convicted, he was punished 
with the terms of a $200.00 fine and a two-month sentence to 
jail. 
3. THE SCORNED ENGLISHMAN 
Thomas Cooper was a doctor and lawyer that 
immigrated to America in 1794.38 After impliedly being rejected 
for a government position within the Adams’ administration, 
Mr. Cooper went on to publish in a local Pennsylvania Gazette 
that Adams was a “power-mad despot,” as well as “an enemy 
‘of the rights of man.’”39 After several anonymous responses by 
President Adams attacking the credibility of Mr. Cooper, Mr. 
Cooper responded by publishing a handbill that stated: 
Nor do I see any impropriety in making this 
request [the application for a government 
appointment] of Mr. Adams. At this time he had 
just entered office; he was hardly in the infancy 
of political mistake; even those who doubted his 
capacity thought well of his intentions. Nor were 
we yet saddled with the expense of a permanent 
navy, or threatened, under his auspices, with the 
existence of a standing army. Our credit was not 
                                                 
37 Id.  
38 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 54 
(2004).  
39 Id.  
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yet reduced so low as to borrow money at eight 
per cent. in time of peace. . . .40 
This statement was enough to get Mr. Cooper charged 
under the Sedition Act of 1798 “with having published a false, 
scandalous and malicious attack on the character of the 
President of the United States, with an intent to excite the hatred 
and contempt of the people of this country against the man of 
their choice.”41 
Mr. Cooper feared of many Constitutional violations 
that would occur at trial, violations that would still stand 
against his Constitutional rights today. The most obvious, and 
the forefront of this article, was the violation of his First 
Amendment right to the freedom of speech. There is no such 
thing as a false opinion, nor can one be charged for exposing 
facts. Here, all that Mr. Cooper expressed was a mere opinion 
with facts scattered throughout. Further, Mr. Cooper expressed 
that he felt that there was no way he could receive an unbiased 
trial. This is a violation of his Due Process bestowed to citizens 
through the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.42 
Although all these violations occurred, the prejudiced 
judicial system of early-America failed Mr. Cooper and allowed 
him to be prosecuted. Ultimately, Mr. Cooper was punished 
with a fine of $400.00 and sentenced to a six-month stint in jail.43 
After sentencing, President Adams attempted to pardon Mr. 
Cooper.44 Mr. Cooper’s only contingency to accepting the 
pardon was that President Adams acknowledge his own breach 
of good faith in leaking the circumstances of Cooper’s job 
application, which President Adams vigorously refused to do.45 
That being said, Mr. Cooper was forced to serve his full 
sentence in prison. 
                                                 
40 Id. at 55.  
41 Id.  
42 This violation was due to the bipartisan nature of the United States 
at the time, as well as due to the actions taken by Justice Samuel 
Chase, which will be discussed infra. See id. at 56.  
43 Id. at 60.  
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
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4. THE “SEDITIOUS” SCOTSMAN 
James Callender was not the picturesque model citizen. 
Mr. Callender was a drunk that had been exiled from England, 
kicked off of the floor of Congress, and was often disassociated 
due to his constant state of being covered in grime and filth.46 
That being said, even before the Sedition Act, he was despised 
by Federalists.47 Mr. Callender appeared on the Federalists’ 
map after publishing a pamphlet titled, The Prospect Before Us.48 
The pamphlet contained phrases such as President Adams “has 
never opened his lips, or lifted his pen without threatening and 
scolding; the grand object of his administration has been to 
exasperate the rage of contending parties, to calumniate and 
destroy every man who differs from his opinions”; accused 
President Adams of contriving “a French war, an American 
navy, a large standing army, an additional load of taxes, and all 
the other symptoms and consequences of debt and despotism”; 
and lastly, that citizens had to “[t]ake [their] choice . . . between 
Adams, war and beggary, and Jefferson, peace and 
competency.” After a vastly biased trial that will be discussed 
infra, Callender was found guilty and in violation of the 
Sedition Act of 1798.49 The punishment bestowed upon him by 
Justice Chase was nine months imprisonment, partnered with a 
$200.00 fine.50 
5. LESS PUBLICITY EQUALS MORE HARSH PUNISHMENT 
David Brown was a wanderer, a politically charged, 
Federalist hating wanderer.51 Although not by his own doing, a 
group of locals, after hearing his anti-Federalist propaganda, 
constructed a “liberty pole” sporting signage that read, “No 
Stamp Act, No Sedition Act, No Alien Bills, No Land Tax, 
downfall to the Tyrants of America; peace and retirement to the 
                                                 
46 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 61 
(2004).  
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 62.  
50 Id.  
51 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 64 
(2004).  
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President; Long Live the Vice-President.”52 Even though this 
liberty pole was generally harmless, one of the most prominent 
Federalist was domiciled in the town in which it was erected, 
therefore leading to a manhunt for the man whose words 
influenced its erection.53 Mr. Brown was arrested, indicted and 
given a trial in June of 1799, with the “Sedition Pole” being the 
underlying charge.54 Just like two instances discussed supra, 
Justice Chase flocked to preside over the trial against the 
“wandering apostle of sedition.”55 After all was said and done, 
Justice Chase enforced the most severe punishment in the 
history of the Sedition Act against Mr. Brown, a fine of $450.00 
and a sentence of eighteen months in prison.56 
Although Mr. Brown received the longest 
imprisonment under the Sedition Act, William Duane, 
arguably, received the worst treatment under the Sedition Act 
of 1798. As acting editor of the Philadelphia Aurora, Mr. Duane 
was one of the most well-regarded critics of the Adams 
administration.57 Due to his constant criticism of President 
Adams, Mr. Duane was subjected to an attempted tar and 
feathering, was arrested for sedition (and was successfully 
acquitted) and was dragged from his office and severely beaten 
and whipped until he was rendered unconscious.58 Mere 
months later, Mr. Duane was again tried for sedition, this time 
under the Sedition Act. During this retrial, the prosecution was 
stopped by an order from the president.59 Although Mr. Duane 
was never formally convicted, he still suffered major bodily 
harm due to the stigma surrounding him and his “seditious” 
view of the Adams’ Administration.  
6. THE SILENCING SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
After a lustrous career as a lawyer and politician, 
Samuel Chase was appointed to the Supreme Court of the 
                                                 
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Brown ended up spending twenty months in jail due to failure to 
pay his fee by the time his eighteen-month sentence elapsed. Id.  
57 Id. at 65.  
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
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United States in 1796 by President George Washington.60 Of 
note in this paper are his actions within the sedition trials in 
which he sat. 
During the trial of Thomas Cooper, Justice Chase 
blocked every defense that Mr. Cooper tried to make. This 
included denying a vast majority of the evidence that Mr. 
Cooper tried to enter to defend himself, as well as denying a 
motion for a continuance to be able to authenticate the evidence 
that the Justice had previously denied.61 But the most damaging 
and unconstitutional action that he took was his blatant 
prejudicing of the jury in these cases.62 Not only did he give 
very damning jury instructions, he would also go through each 
line of the alleged illegal statement and tell the jury how he 
thought each provision violated the Sedition Act of 1798.63 
Additionally, he deliberately went on the record stating that 
Mr. Cooper knew that everything that he (Mr. Cooper) 
published was untrue and placed a very strict burden on Mr. 
Cooper to prove otherwise.64  
The next groundbreaking trial that Justice Chase sat for 
was the trial of James Callendar. In this matter, Justice Chase 
personally received the pamphlet in question and found that 
Mr. Callender had violated the Sedition Act of 1798.65 Further, 
Justice Chase treated the Callender trial the same exact way as 
he did Mr. Cooper’s, denying motions for continuance and not 
allowing Mr. Callender’s counsel to call their witnesses.66 On 
top of the prejudice when ruling on the motions by counsel, 
Justice Chase was “intemperate, rude, partial, and 
contemptuous” to Mr. Callender’s attorneys.67 Justice Chase 
was so abusive to Mr. Callender’s counsel that they eventually 
withdrew to spare themselves the castigation.68 Following the 
guilty verdict, Justice Chase chastised Mr. Callender in regard 
to “the evils of sowing ‘discord among the people’ and asserted 
                                                 
60 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 58 
(2004).  
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 58-59.  
63 Id. at 59.  
64 Id. at 60.  
65 Id. at 62.  
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
SILENCING “SEDITION”  31 
 31 
that Callender’s attack on Adams was ‘an attack upon the 
people themselves.’”69 Many called for impeachment after 
seeing Justice Chase’s true colors during the Callender trial. 
D. HOW THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 WAS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
“I regret exceedingly regret, that I feel impelled to 
recount this history of the Federalist Sedition Act because, in all 
truth, it must be pointed out that this law-which has since been 
almost universally condemned as unconstitutional . . . .”70 Just 
as it was difficult for Justice Holmes in that 1961 dissent, it is 
difficult to fathom and address all of the Constitution-defying 
atrocities that took place during the Sedition Act of 1798 era. As 
discussed supra, some of the landmark arrests under the 
Sedition Act and/or common law sedition violated a plethora 
of Constitutional rights, including, but not limited to the 
freedom of the press71, the freedom of speech, due process72, as 
well as other less prevalent violations such as the right to 
counsel73, the right to an impartial jury, and the right to not have 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
Federalists argued that codifying seditious libel was 
necessary and proper under Article I, Section 874 of the 
                                                 
69 Id.  
70 Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 
U.S. 1, 159 (1961) (Justice Holmes dissenting). 
71 This occurred either by shutting down whole publishing entities, 
or by arresting the editors of these publishing companies, therefore 
eliminating the possibility for publications to be made. 
72 The bias and partiality present in the presiding judges, especially 
Justice Chase, would be enough to show that these victims would 
not have been served under due process of the law. 
73 Some of the victims represented themselves in these matters, yet as 
an indictment against the Sedition Act of 1798 is a criminal matter, 
they were entitled to having counsel appointed to them. 
74 Article I, Section 8 enumerates the powers of Congress, including 
its authority to make “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. CONST. ART I, § 
8. 
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Constitution to protect the survival of the state.75 Conversely, 
the Jeffersonians argued, and I agree, that Article III, Section 2, 
extending the judicial power to all cases in law and equity 
arising under the Constitution, applied only to controversies 
regarding the interpretation or application of 
constitutional provisions; it did not authorize common-law 
jurisdiction in the federal courts.76 Therefore, the national 
government did not have an inherent right to prosecute 
seditious libel at common law or pass a sedition statute.77 
Furthermore, the necessary and proper clause only permits 
legislation that affects the expressly delegated powers of 
Congress, which did not allow a sedition law.78 Albert Gallatin, 
a prominent Jeffersonian, argued that allowing the Sedition Act 
to be constitutional would greatly expand federal power and 
ran contrary to the First Amendment.79 Gallatin further 
reasoned that the only way that this type of legislation may be 
permissible was if it was passed at a time of dire need and was 
necessary to save the country. This was not the case during the 
enactment of the Sedition Act of 1798, even though the 
Federalists cloaked the passing of the Act as a response to 
pending war with the French, in reality, it was merely a “war” 
against the Jeffersonians. That being said, the war powers, or 
any related national security power, should not apply and 
therefore, the passing of the Sedition Act of 1798 was 
unconstitutional. Another argument can be and was made, that 
all of the statements above were mere opinions. Furthermore, it 
was argued that there is no such thing as a false opinion, and 
therefore, it could not be attacked under the Sedition Act of 
1798.80 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 Jenkins, supra note 13, at 179.  
76 Id. at 180-81.  
77 Id. at 181.  
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 54 
(2004). 
SILENCING “SEDITION”  33 
 33 
III. DUE TO ITS VIOLATION OF INDIVIDUALS’ FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS, THE GENERAL ORDERS AND ACTS THAT 
FOLLOWED PRESIDENT LINCOLN’S SUSPENSION OF HABEAS 
CORPUS WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
During the sixty-five years between the respective 
reigns of President Adams and President Lincoln, the 
“sedition” front was relatively quiet. Although sedition most 
certainly occurred during this time, the lack of edginess due to 
the proximity of war kept the sedition enforcement civil. This 
all changed after the memorable storm of Fort Sumter. The Civil 
War brought back sedition and its enforcement with a 
vengeance. As were the circumstances at the time of the 
Sedition Act of 1798, the nation at the outset of the Civil War 
was highly factional, with a split between Democrats and 
Republicans. Due to this, there were two hard-set opinions 
regarding several monumentally important issues, such as 
slavery and succession. That being said, individuals that held 
opinions opposite of the Republican federal government often 
found themselves being labeled as “seditious” and to some, 
borderline treasonous. This led to the course of action described 
infra. 
A. SETTING AND CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE SUSPENSION OF 
HABEAS CORPUS AND INSTITUTION OF GENERAL ORDER 38 
The United States was no longer united. Brothers were 
fighting brothers; fathers were killing sons. The worst sin at the 
time was to support the Confederacy, or even simpler, not 
supporting the Union effort in the war. With that being said, we 
live in a sinful world, and there were often “dissenters” who 
spoke against the war, the Union, and/or the abolishment of 
slavery. This opposition infuriated President Lincoln, but he 
was calculated in his steps to combat this “sedition.” President 
Lincoln absolutely refused to enact a new Sedition Act; he did 
not want to give more ammunition for his critics to label him as 
a “tyrant” even further.81 In addition, he also did not want to 
come off as a hypocrite due to his stance on the Mexican War. 
                                                 
81 Phrases such as “Caesar,” “usurper,” “demagogue,” “tyrant,” and 
“dictator” were being used to describe President Lincoln.  
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So, President Lincoln found a middle ground.82 He found this 
middle ground in the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 
On September 24, 1862, President Lincoln issued an 
order suspending the writ of habeas corpus.83 A little-known 
fact is that President Lincoln actually suspended the writ of 
habeas corpus three separate times during the war.84 Directly 
resulting from these suspensions were the arrests of roughly 
13,535 citizens.85 The combination of the arrests and the loss of 
rights caused riots to ignite during summer of 1863.86 Mobs 
killed several enrollment officers, as well as anti-draft, anti-
black violence having erupted in many northern cities.87 One 
example can be seen in New York, where four days of rioting 
left one-hundred and five people dead.88 At its time, this was 
the worst riot in American history.89 
On top of all of the rioting, General Ambrose Burnside 
noted that “newspapers were full of treasonable expressions” 
and that “large public meetings were held, at which our 
Government authorities and our gallant soldiers in the field 
were openly and loudly denounced for their efforts to suppress 
the rebellion.”90 In response to this, General Burnside declared 
martial law and issued General Order No. 38, which will be 
detailed infra.91 
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist: 
Whatever the theory of martial law might be, its 
consequences . . . during the Civil War were 
quite apparent. Statements critical of the 
government, whether appearing in the press or 
                                                 
82 Or more appropriately, his version of a middle ground, as this act 
was deemed radical by some, even in 1862.  
83 Geoffrey R. Stone, Abraham Lincoln’s First Amendment, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2003). 
84 Kevin Goldberg, A Review of Silencing the Opposition: Gov’t 
Strategies of Suppression of Freedom of Expression, by Craig R. Smith , Ed., 
5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 245, 246 (1997).  
85 Id.  
86 Stone, supra note 83, at 3-4.  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 5.  
91 Id.  
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made in the course of political oratory, were 
punished by fine and imprisonment. Homes of 
suspects could be broken into without warrants. 
And none of this was in accordance with laws 
enacted by any legislature or city council. 
Martial law was the voice of whichever general 
was in command.92 
That being said, Burnside’s issuance of General Order 
No. 38 was the catalyst for what turned out to be the Civil War’s 
most notorious arrest and prosecution for “sedition,” as will be 
discussed in detail infra.93 
B. THE LAW ITSELF, THE SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS 
AND GENERAL ORDER NO. 38 
When President Lincoln finally took action regarding 
the “seditious” acts taking place in the country, he acted by 
issuing a proclamation suspending the writ of habeas corpus 
and further, declaring martial law in all of these areas for “all 
persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia 
drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice . . . affording aid and 
comfort to Rebels.”94 Following this proclamation, on April, 19, 
1863, General Burnside, commander of the “Department of the 
Ohio,” declared martial law and issued General Order No. 38, 
which announced, among other things, that “[t]he habit of 
declaring sympathies for the enemy will not be allowed in this 
Department.”95  
C. LANDMARK ARRESTS UNDER THE SUSPENSION OF 
HABEAS CORPUS AND GENERAL ORDER NO. 38 
On May 1, 1863, Clement L. Vallandigham, a prominent 
“Copperhead,”96 and former Ohioan Congressman, made a 
speech in Mount Vernon, Ohio, a speech for which he was 
                                                 
92 Id. at 5 n. 27.  
93 Id. at 6.  
94 Id. at 3.  
95 Id. at 5; JAMES G. RANDALL. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER 
LINCOLN 175-76 (1926). 
96 The “Copperheads” were a faction of anti-war Democrats during 
the Civil War era.  
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ultimately arrested for under General Burnside’s General Order 
No. 38.97  This speech was to a rather large crowd that amassed 
roughly 20,000 individuals and spanned roughly two hours in 
time.98 In response to receiving information about this speech, 
on May 5, 1863, without consulting President Lincoln, General 
Burnside ordered Union soldiers to arrest Vallandigham.99 At 
roughly 2:30 in the morning, hordes of men arrived at Mr. 
Vallandigham’s home, knocked down his door, seized him 
from his bed, and escorted him to a prison in Cincinnati.100 
Vallandigham was then brought before the specially convened 
five-member military commission and further, charged with 
“publicly expressing, in violation of General [Order] No. 38 . . . 
his sympathies for those in arms against the . . . United States, 
declaring disloyal . . . opinions with the object . . . of weakening 
the power of the Government . . . to suppress an unlawful 
rebellion.”101 Other accounts state that during this speech, it is 
actually “where [Vallandigham] defended the right of people to 
assemble at any time to hear the policy of the current 
administration debated.”102 Further, Vallandigham asserted 
that he had a “right to speak and criticize . . . based upon 
‘General [Order] No. 1.,’ the Constitution of the United 
States.”103 Vallandigham also called the war “wicked, cruel, and 
unnecessary,” declared that it was a “war for the freedom of 
blacks and the enslavement of the whites” and asserted that 
General Order No. 38 was a “base usurpation of arbitrary 
                                                 
97 JAMES G. RANDALL. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 
176 (1926). 
98 Stone, supra note 83, at 9; GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE 
SPEECH IN WARTIME 101 (2004). 
99 Not surprisingly, the arrest took place in a very similar fashion to 
the apprehension of Matthew Lyon and Anthony Haswell as 
mentioned supra. Geoffrey R. Stone, Abraham Lincoln’s First 
Amendment, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2003); GEOFFREY R. STONE, 
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 101 (2004). 
100 Id. (as to both sources). 
101 JAMES G. RANDALL. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 
176 (1926).  
102 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 101 
(2004).  
103 Id. (People had the constitutional right to debate the policies of the 
national administration.) 
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authority.”104 Lastly, of note, Vallandigham urged the crowd to 
get to the ballot box to “hurl ‘King Lincoln’ from his throne.”105 
Initially, Vallandigham refused to plead as he denied 
the jurisdiction of the court, but ultimately, the Judge Advocate 
entered a plea of “not guilty.”106 During the trial, Vallandigham 
was allowed counsel, was permitted to personally cross-
examine witnesses, and was given the advantage of 
compulsory attendance of witnesses in his favor.107 
Vallandigham declared that he was not triable by a military 
commission, nor was any non-soldier American citizen, but was 
entitled to all the constitutional guarantees concerning due 
process of arrest, indictment, and jury trial. Further, 
Vallandigham pleaded that he was being persecuted for mere 
“words of criticism of the public policy, of the public servants 
of the people.”108 Additionally, Vallandigham explained his 
actions as follows:  
If I were to find a man from the enemy’s country 
distributing in my [camp’s] speeches of their 
public men that tended to demoralize the troops, 
or to destroy their confidence in the constituted 
authorities of the government, I would have him 
tried, and hung if found guilty, and all the rules 
of modern warfare would sustain me. Why 
should such speeches from our own public men 
be allowed? . . . If the people do not approve [the 
government’s] policy, they can change the 
constitutional authorities of that government, at 
the proper time and by the proper method. Let 
them freely discuss the policy in a proper tone, 
but my duty requires me to stop license and 
intemperate discussion, which tends to weaken 
the authority of the government and army . . . 
there is no fear of the people losing their 
                                                 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 JAMES G. RANDALL. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 
177 (1926).  
107 Id.  
108 Id.; GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 
101 (2004). 
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liberties; we all know that to be the cry of 
demagogues, and none but the ignorant will 
listen.109  
Not fond of Vallandigham’s explanations, the military 
tribunal found Vallandigham “guilty as charged” and held that 
his speech at Mount Vernon “could but induce in his hearers a 
distrust of their own Government and sympathy for those in 
arms against it, and a disposition to resist the laws of the 
land.”110 With that being said, Vallandigham was sentenced to 
imprisonment at Fort Warren in the Boston Harbor for the 
duration of the war.111 
Vallandigham immediately filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.112 In that petition, Vallandigham argued several 
issues: that he had been denied due process of law; that he had 
the right to be tried on the indictment of a grand jury; that he 
had the right to a public trial by an impartial jury; that he had 
the right to confront the witnesses against him that he had and 
the right to have compulsory process for witnesses in his 
behalf.113 He asserted that these were all guaranteed by the Bill 
of Rights.114 Even though the writ of habeas corpus was still 
intact at this moment in time, Judge Humphrey H. Leavitt 
denied Vallandigham’s petition. A very well-respected First 
Amendment scholar, Professor Geoffrey Stone, summarized 
Judge Leavitt’s denial brilliantly: 
Judge Leavitt reasoned that “[t]he court cannot 
shut its eyes to the grave fact that war exists, 
involving the most imminent public danger, and 
threatening the subversion and destruction of 
the constitution itself.” “Self-preservation,” he 
added “is a paramount law,” and this is “not a 
time when anyone connected with the judicial 
department” should in any way “embarrass or 
                                                 
109 Stone, supra note 83, at 10.  
110 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 101 
(2004).  
111 Id.  
112 At this point in time, President Lincoln did not have the ancient 
writ suspended. Stone, supra note 83, at 11.  
113 Id.  
114 Id.  
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thwart the executive in his efforts to deliver the 
country from the dangers which press so heavily 
upon it.” In the face of a rebellion, Leavitt 
argued, “the president . . . is invested with very 
high powers,” and “in deciding what he may 
rightfully do” under these powers, “the 
president is guided solely by his own judgment 
and discretion and is only amenable for an abuse 
of his authority by impeachment.” 
* * * 
Turning to the specific circumstances at issue, 
Judge Leavitt observed that “[a]rtful men, 
disguising their latent treason under hollow 
pretensions of devotion to the Union,” have 
been “striving to disseminate their pestilent 
heresies among the masses of the people.” 
Because the “evil was one of alarming 
magnitude,” General Burnside was reasonable 
in perceiving “the dangerous consequences of 
these disloyal efforts” and in resolving, “if 
possible, to suppress them.” Noting that “there 
is too much of the pestilential leaven of 
disloyalty in the community,” Judge Leavitt 
concluded that those who criticize the 
government in time of crisis “must learn that 
they cannot stab its vitals with impunity.”115 
Another noted scholar, James G. Randall, recounted the 
petition’s hearing as follows: 
The course pursued by Judge Leavitt was 
unusual. Taking the ground that he might refuse 
the writ if satisfied that the petitioner would not 
be discharged after a hearing, he notified 
General Burnside of the application and invited 
him to present a statement. The usual procedure 
would have been to issue the writ as “of right” 
                                                 
115 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 103 
(2004).  
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and let the General’s statement appear in his 
return thereto. Burnside justified his action on 
the ground that the country was in a “state of 
civil war,” that in such a time great 
responsibility rests on public men not to “use 
license and plead that they are exercising 
liberty,” and that his duty required him to stop 
intemperate discussion which tended to weaken 
the army. His statement was a sort of stump 
speech in justification of his “General Order No. 
38” and his treatment of Vallandigham. Judge 
Leavitt refused the writ and the case was 
brought up to the Supreme Court of the United 
States on a motion for certiorarito review the 
sentence of the military commission. 
Vallandigham’s attorney argued that a military 
commission has but a special and limited 
jurisdiction which does not extend to the trial of 
a citizen unconnected with the land or naval 
forces. The charge on which the prisoner was 
tried was unknown to the law, he contended, 
and the sentence was in excess of jurisdiction. 
General Burnside had no authority to enlarge 
the jurisdiction of a military commission; and as 
a remedy for such unwarranted excess of 
authority, the Supreme Court of the United 
States had the power to issue a writ of certiorari. 
Taking its opinion bodily from the argument of 
Judge Advocate General Hort[,] the Supreme 
Court refused to review the proceedings of the 
military commission. In stating the grounds of 
this refusal, the [C]ourt declared that its 
authority was derived from the Constitution and 
the legislation of Congress, its original 
jurisdiction being specified in the [C]onstitution 
islets, and its late jurisdiction being derived from 
the Judiciary Act of 1789. A military 
commission, it was said, is not a court within the 
meaning of that act, and the Supreme Court 
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“cannot . . . originate a writ of certiorarito review 
. . . the proceedings of a military commission.”116 
“I am here in a military bastille for no other offense than 
my political opinions.”117 Publications spanning the country 
were “quick to champion his basic right to freedom of speech, 
war or no war.”118 Just as the first time President Lincoln 
suspended the writ of habeas corpus, Vallandigham’s order of 
imprisonment triggered a riot in almost every major northern 
city, including his hometown of Dayton, Ohio.119 
Records show that President Lincoln was ashamed by 
Burnside’s arrest of Vallandigham.120 When he permitted 
General Order No. 38 to stand, President Lincoln intended for 
it to be targeted towards “deserters, draft dodgers, bridge-
burners, and others who gave concrete aid to the secessionists,” 
not Vallandigham, a high-powered Copperhead that was 
arrested for mere political speech.121 President Lincoln’s cabinet 
and closest confidants were skeptical as well. Gideon Welles, 
the Secretary of the Navy, stated that he felt that 
Vallandigham’s imprisonment “was an error on the part of 
Burnside.”122 Other cabinet members questioned whether the 
arrest was necessary and were weary of the legitimacy of trying 
Vallandigham before a military commission.123 According to 
John Nicolay and John Hay, President Lincoln’s secretaries, if 
the president had “been consulted before any proceedings were 
initiated” he probably “would not have permitted them.”124 
Even with disdain shrouding this arrest and conviction, 
President Lincoln, who generally allowed great leniency with 
                                                 
116 JAMES G. RANDALL. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 
176-79 (1926). 
117 I find this quote to be one of the most powerful, and telling, 
quotes of this altercation and era in history. Id.  
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 108.  
121 Id. at 108-09; Later in time, President Lincoln publically admitted 
“I do not know whether I would have ordered the arrest of Mr. 
Vallandigham.” GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN 
WARTIME 108 (2004).  
122 Id. at 109.  
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
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his generals, corresponded with Burnside and within that, told 
him that he could count on the Lincoln administration’s 
support. Specifically, President Lincoln penned, “[a]ll the 
cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting . . . Vallandigham, 
some perhaps, doubting, that there was a real necessity for it - 
but being done, all were for seeing you through with it.”125 All 
factors being considered, Vallandigham’s arrest forced 
President Lincoln to consider just how far he would allow the 
suppression of “sedition” or dissent.126 In a last-ditch effort to 
soften the blow against himself and his administration, 
President Lincoln commuted Vallandigham’s sentence, 
changing the terms from imprisonment in Boston at Fort 
Warren, to exile in the Confederacy.127 
People all across the nation cried out against 
Vallandigam’s arrest: “a crime has been committed against . . . 
the right to think, to speak, to live”; “Vallandigham was 
arrested for no crime known to law”; if not reversed “free 
speech dies, and with it our liberty, the constitution and our 
country.”128 In response to this discontent, a group of 
Democrats convened in Albany, New York, to discuss potential 
resolutions. At the end of the meeting, the participants settled 
upon, and put to paper, ten resolutions against the Lincoln 
administration.129 The “Albany Resolves” demanded that 
“Lincoln honor the liberties of citizens, assailed the military’s 
‘arbitrary’ arrests and use of military commissions to try 
civilians, and charged that Vallandigham had been 
unconstitutionally convicted and exiled for criticizing the 
government.”130 
After receiving the resolutions, President Lincoln 
credited the authors of the “Albany Resolves” with being 
“eminently patriotic” in their “censure” of the actions of his 
administration but ultimately, President Lincoln contested the 
charges of the unconstitutionality of the arrest, conviction, and 
banishment of Vallandigham. Again, relying on the findings of 
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Mr. Stone, Lincoln’s vindictive words can be read in pertinent 
part stating: 
It is asserted . . . that Mr. Vallandigham was, by 
a military commander, seized and tried “for no 
other reason than words addressed to a public 
meeting, in criticism of the course of the 
Administration, and in condemnation of the 
Military orders of the General.” Now, if there be 
no mistake about this; if this assertion is the truth 
and the whole truth; if there was no other reason 
for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest was 
wrong. But the arrest, as I understand, was made 
for a very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham 
avows his hostility to the War on the part of the 
Union; and his arrest was made because he was 
laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising 
of troops; to encourage desertions from the 
[A]rmy; and to leave the Rebellion without an 
adequate military force to suppress it. He was 
not arrested because he was damaging the 
political prospects of the Administration, or the 
personal interests of the Commanding General, 
but because he was damaging the Army, upon 
the existence and vigor of which the life of the 
Nation depends. He was warring upon the 
Military, and this gave the Military 
constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon 
him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the 
military power of the country, then his arrest 
was made on mistake of fact, which I would be 
glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory 
evidence.  
* * * 
Long experience has shown that armies cannot 
be maintained unless desertions shall be 
punished by the severe penalty of death. . . . 
Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who 
deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily 
agitator who induces him to desert? This is none 
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the less injurious when effected by getting a 
father, or brother, or friend, into a public 
meeting, and there working upon his feeling till 
he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he 
is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked 
Administration of a contemptible Government, 
too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall 
desert. I think that in such a case to silence the 
agitator, and save the boy is not only 
constitutional, but withal a great mercy.131 
D. HOW THE SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND 
MOREOVER, GENERAL ORDER NO. 38, WERE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL  
As a precursor, it is important to remember that in 1861, 
Chief Justice Tawny penned: 
1. That the president, under the constitution of 
the United States, cannot suspend the privilege 
of the writ of habeas corpus, nor authorize a 
military officer to do it. 2. A military officer has 
no right to arrest and detain a person not subject 
to the rules and articles of war, for an offence 
against the laws of the United States, except in 
aid of the judicial authority, and subject to its 
control; and if the party be arrested by the 
military, it is the duty of the officer to deliver 
him over immediately to the civil authority, to 
be dealt with according to law.132 
With the Ex parte Merryman decision in mind, the next thing one 
should look at is the pair of Supreme Court decisions known as 
Ex parte Vallandigham,133 referencing the above-mentioned case, 
and Ex parte Milligan.134 
In Ex parte Vallandigham, the Supreme Court tucked 
their tails and punted on ruling whether or not Mr. 
                                                 
131 Id.  
132 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). 
133 Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863).  
134 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).  
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Vallandigham’s constitutional rights had been violated.  
Without blatantly stating so, the Supreme Court essentially 
affirmed Judge Advocate General Leavitt’s statement that 
during war the judiciary cannot “embarrass” or “thwart” the 
efforts of the president or the executive branch.135 Furthermore, 
the Court implied that judges lack the capability and expertise 
of weighing constitutional liberties during wartime, and 
therefore, since Congress had not granted them an enumerated 
right to hear appeals from a military tribunal, the Court would 
not, and could not, start doing so now.136 The Court then denied 
Mr. Vallandigham’s writ of cert. 
This ruling directly contrasts with the holding a mere 
three years later in Ex parte Milligan. Here, Justice Davis, 
speaking for the Court, held that trials of civilians by 
presidentially created military commissions are 
unconstitutional. He further stated that martial law cannot exist 
where the civil courts are operating. Additionally, Davis stated 
that the Constitution, “is a law for rulers and people, equally in 
war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all 
classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.”137 
With this being said, the Supreme Court directly answered the 
question they punted when determining Mr. Vallandigham’s 
fate, and moreover, found the exact actions that happened to 
Mr. Vallandigham and others throughout the Civil War were 
blatantly unconstitutional. 
Article 1, Section 9 of the United States 
Constitution states, “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”138 Even 
though the circumstances were met to enact this clause of the 
Constitution, it was not enacted by the proper person, or body 
of people, that is. President Lincoln took it upon himself to 
                                                 
135 See Ex parte Vallandigham 68 U.S. at 249-53. 
136 Contrary to this, in United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871), the 
Supreme Court held that the Constitution vests judicial power in the 
judicial branch, and that neither the legislative nor the executive 
branch may interfere with the functioning of the judiciary. Therefore, 
all this Court did was try to please the likes of President Lincoln and 
avoid controversy.  
137 DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 165 (2003).  
138 U.S. CONST. ART I, § 9. 
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suspend the writ of habeas corpus; a cause of action that, 
constitutionally, is only permitted to be done by Congress. 
Congress having moved to suspend the writ in order to pass 
constitutional muster, after the fact, is simply not enough. 
Constitutional rights are exactly that, rights, and unless the 
government follows their powers how they have been 
enumerated or implied, they are violating the Constitution and 
their citizens’ constitutional rights.  
Some argue that the Constitution, essentially, does not 
apply during times of war. I argue the complete opposite. When 
is the structure and rigidity of the Constitution needed more 
than in a time of chaos? While the country was awry, the people 
needed to know that the one thing they could count on was 
their constitutional rights.139 People such as Clement 
Vallandigham did not get this privilege. Instead, he got 
imprisoned and exiled, failed to receive due process, and was 
made an outcast all for a mere opinion, an opinion that the 
president himself said that he felt was not enough for arrest, let 
alone imprisonment and exile. 
With this being said, Professor Stone pieced together 
Lincoln’s likely analysis that he used to determine 
Vallandigham’s fate. He stated, “We can infer that Lincoln 
would uphold such a restriction if three conditions are satisfied: 
(1) the speaker specifically intends to cause unlawful conduct; 
(2) the speech will seriously interfere with the activities of the 
military; and (3) the speaker does not expressly discourage 
unlawful conduct.”140 It is further stated that they likely would 
have needed to show a “palpable injury” resulting from the 
alleged “sedition.”141 With this being said, as stated supra, 
President Lincoln conceded that if Vallandigham had been 
convicted for “no other reason” than his criticism of the 
presidential administration, then his “arrest was wrong.”142 
Due to his course of actions, President Lincoln “must have 
                                                 
139 Some argue that it was fundamental for Americans during Civil 
War “to admit that the Constitution is binding during war . . . .”  
Stone, supra note 83, at 29. 
140 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 117 
(2004).  
141 DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 172 (2003).  
142 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 113 
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believed that Vallandigham expressly advocated for unlawful 
conduct such as desertion . . . .”143 Regardless of the result, this 
concession is vital to note, in that “it states unequivocally that, 
even in wartime, the government cannot constitutionally 
punish a speaker for criticizing the policies, programs, or 
actions of the government, regardless of their potential to 
interfere with the activities of the military.”144 Although we can 
only imply that that is what Lincoln personally thought, records 
show that “people closest to Vallandigham state that his 
speeches never insisted on people resisting or breaking the 
law.”145 With these facts and the “Stone factors,” mentioned 
supra, being considered, it is likely that the circumstances 
surrounding Vallandigham were not enough to accuse his 
speech as being seditious, and further to punish him for it. It is 
worth noting that even “many Republicans . . . stood up to 
protect” the violated rights of Vallandigham and others, 
“believing that assaults on the tradition [of free expression] 
ultimately threatened the liberty of all.”146 147 
IV. ADAMS AND LINCOLN COMPARED: A SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSION 
President Adams and President Lincoln, respectfully, 
are two of the most notorious “silencers” in history. Although 
President Adams followed procedure in passing his right-
infringing Sedition Act, while President Lincoln, dictatorially, 
instituted the suspension of writs and initiated a state of martial 
law at his own will, both violated the Constitutional rights of 
several citizens. In a straight comparison, I would have to say 
that President Adams was the more infringing of the two. With 
that being said, neither party’s actions were acceptable.  
                                                 
143 Id. at 115.  
144 Stone, supra note 83, at 22. 
145 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 115 
(2004). 
146 Stone, supra note 83, at 23. 
147 Although the content of this article mainly focuses on individuals’ 
rights being violated, other instances, such as President Lincoln’s 
attack on the New York World were even more blatant attacks on 
“sedition” and further, violations of the Constitution. DANIEL 
FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 173 (2003). 
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In both cases, the “sedition” was very similar. Lyon, 
Haswell, and Cooper all labeled President Adams as synonyms 
related to “power-hungry” and “idiot,” while Vallandigham 
favored words more similar to “tyrant” and “dictator.” Both 
circumstances significantly violated the individuals’ due 
process right, as well as their First Amendment rights, while 
other rights were definitively violated in the Adams era148, as 
well as in the Lincoln era.149 150 
In both circumstances, documents were drafted in 
response to the Constitutional violations. In response to the 
Sedition Act of 1798 were the Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions, while the riposte to the actions against Mr. 
Vallandigham was the Albany Resolves. Although both were 
originally largely ignored or rebutted, their contents later 
became the law after all was said and done.  
As far as post-imprisonment, the main players’ paths 
were both similar and different. Matthew Lyon ran for, and 
won, a seat in Congress while in prison. After serving his term, 
he temporarily retired from politics, but ultimately returned. 
He often displayed his scorn for President Adams. 
Vallandigham was exiled to the Confederacy, but eventually 
made his way to Canada before returning to Ohio. He also ran 
for a political office, seeking the title of governor of Ohio. This 
election went handedly against him. After a few more attempts 
at various office positions, Vallandigham helped form a new 
faction of Democrats, as well as resuming his practice of law, 
which ultimately led to his death.151 
In conclusion, after an analysis of the facts considered in 
this article, it is obvious to see how President Adams and 
President Lincoln both violated several Constitutional rights in 
                                                 
148 Right to counsel, etc.  
149 Right to a jury trial, etc.  
150 As stated before, this is strictly related to individual rights. Both 
presidents violated the Constitution in regard to restrictions of the 
press, by either completely condemning publications for what they 
had already stated or by closing them to prophylactically keep them 
from stating anything they disagreed with.  
151 While performing trial preparation, Vallandigham accidentally 
shot himself with a weapon while trying to figure out how to 
demonstrate to a jury that the victim could have easily accidentally 
shot himself with this weapon. Irony at its finest. GEOFFREY R. STONE, 
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 120 (2004). 
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favor of “national security,” as recourse of public reprimand, 
and in an attempt to “silence sedition.” 
